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THE COPYRIGHTING OF CONTRIBUTIONS
TO COMPOSITE WORKS: SOME
ATTEN)ANT PROBLEMS
The United States Copyright Code,' as is well known
to those who have studied it and have had to apply its
provisions, is, unfortunately, anything but a paradigm of
careful legislative draftsmanship.2 While the Code might
be consigned to limbo it would not, despite a charitable
appraisal, be entitled to a place in "... that lawyer's Para-
dise where all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained
meaning.... "' Quite to the contrary, the Code contains not
only broad and indefinite so-called container-terms of
critical import such as "writings,".4 "works of art, " "pub-
1 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-32, 101-116, 201-215 (1952). The basic
copyright act of today went into effect on July 1, 1909, 35 STAT. 1075 (1909).
It was thereafter amended as follows by: 37 STAT. 488 (1912); 37 STAT. 724
(1913); 38 STAT. 311 (1914); 41 STAT. 368 (1919); 44 STAT. 818 (1926); 45
STAT. 713 (1928); 53 STAT. 1142 (1939); 54 STAT. 51 (1940); 55 STAT. 732
(1941). Subsequently, in 1947, it was codified into positive law by 61 STAT.
652 (1947), and since then has been further amended by 62 STAT. 202, 869
(1948); 63 STAT. 153 (1949); 65 STAT. 710 (1951); 66 STAT. 752 (1952); and by
68 STAT. 1030 (1954), 17 U.S.C. §§ 9, 16, 19 (Supp. 1955).
2 M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F2d 949 (2d Cir.
1942), affd, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Shilkret v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 131 F.2d
929 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 742 (1943); Chafee, Reflections on
the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 CoLuM. L. Rv. 503, 520 (1945); Kaplan, Pub-
lication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 469, 473 (1955), where it is said of the Code: "... whose deficiencies
have often been noted and lamented."
a THAzrm, A PREImITARY TREATISE ON EViDENCE AT =sn CommoN LAW 428
(1898).
4 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1952). This word is not to be read literally and will
include at least those non-chirographic works specified in § 5 of the Code
and that has been so since Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53 (1884), where a photograph was held to be copyrightable under the
Act of June 18, 1874, c. 301, 18 STAT. 78, photographs having been first
introduced as copyrightable subject matter in the Act of March 3, 1865, c.
124, 13 STAT. 540. § 5 states that its enumeration is not to ".. . be held to
limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4... ." The Su-
preme Court has never definitely fixed the outer limits of "writings." In
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the majority of that Court refused to do
so, being content to rest upon the assumption that a statue is a "writing."
5 17 U.S.C. § 5. The predecessor copyright acts had all specified which
works were to be subject to copyright However, the Code is deliberately
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lication"' and "infringement",7 to name a few at random,
but also considerable ambiguous,' loose9 and textually
inconsistent" language. That being so, it has devolved
upon the courts, incident to their search for, and effectua-
tion of, legislative meaning and purpose, to fill those con-
tainers with appropriate content and reasonably to clarify,
tighten and harmonize that language.
Furthermore, since statutory copyright has been with
us a long time, with the first congressional enactment in
1790" (and even before that, individual states, at the be-
hest of the Continental Congress,' had passed copyright
acts of their own' 3), many of the words which the legisla-
tive mind speaks and the judicial mind hears on the sub-
ject gather meaning, preforce, from ". . . thaeir setting in
history."' 4 Therefore, as persuasive aids, though not con-
5 continued
vague since it was considered desirable to substitute a general catch-all for
artistic works rather than to identify them particularly. See the statement on
this point made by the Librarian of Congress at that time, Herbert Putnam,
Esq., before the House and Senate Committees on June 6, 1906, in con-
nection with S.6330 and H.R. 19853.
6 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 13, 24, 26 (1952). This term, the meaning of which
is crucial to the initiation of copyright under the Code, appears frequently
therein. However, it is undefined, and has been said to be a word of "...
no definite and fixed meaning." Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204, 206 (9th
Cir. 1938).
7 17 U.S.C. § 101.
8 M. Witmark & Sons case supra note 2, at 951.
9 Shilkret case supra note 2, at 932.
10 Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946), where the
court, at 487, adverted to the undoubted"... textual difficulty in reconciling
all the sections. . . " of the Code.
"2 1 STAT. 124, approved May 31, 1790, and entitled, An Act for the en-
couragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned.
32 The recommendation is found in the resolution of May 2,1783, and was
based upon the report of a committee consisting of Messrs. Madison, Izard
and Williamson.
33 All of the original thirteen states did so with the exception of Delaware.
14 FmanxmsT=, SoME REcioNs ON HE READ3NG or STATUTS 15 (1947).
Meaning, of course, is also derived from ". . . the words themselves.
and ". . . their setting in a text . . ." Ibid.
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clusive,'5 to the interpretation of the Code resort has been
had not only to the Code's own immediate legislative
history, as evidenced by the report of the committees of the
House and Senate which had proposed it,'6 but also to the
prior copyright acts and their history.' Moreover, the
following reflection of Mr. Justice Frankfurter on reading
and construing statutes generally expresses with singular
accuracy the judicial approach to the Copyright Code in
particular: "If the purpose of [statutory] construction is
the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically
relevant should be excluded."'
The Code is the Congress' present means by which
fundamental copyright policy sanctioned by the Constitu-
tion, as articulated in the so-called copyright clause,3
is carried out. That clause generates a very broad grant of
legislative power symbolized by such key concepts as the
promoting of "... . the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive
Right to their... Writings .... " As a corollary, those con-
cepts define the purpose of the Code and fix the dimen-
sions of its valid functioning.
In the following paper it shall be our purpose to con-
sider some of what are believed to be the more critical
problems which confront authors and proprietors of copy-
rightable artistic and literary material, with special ref-
erence to the use thereof in composite works, including
periodicals.
Taking first things first, chronologically as well as
15 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 210 (1954).
16 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909). The Senate adopted
this report as its own.
11 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M.
Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
I8 FRANxFuRt,, op. cit. supra note 14, at 23. The extent to which the
Supreme Court has gone, disdaining "to hug the shores of the statute Itself,"
was- indicated, with perhaps no little ostentatious industry, in Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. K. Witmark & Sos, supra note 17, at 658.
19 U.S.Cozs, art I, § 8, 61. 8.
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logically, every copyright inquiry begins with intellectual
creation or production, or at least with what passes as such,
and with the common law's recognition of "a distinctive
literary property" therein, arising instantly from creation
or production.2' For the common law the author is con-
sidered the primary and crucial man, and authorship the
ultimate provenience of rights.21 Authorship necessarily
implies originality,22 and must manifest itself in some con-
crete way, such as by means of a definite collocation of
words, lines, colors or sounds, before the common law
property will attach." However, this is a particular species
of hypostatic property in the "work" which exists apart
fom,24 and is transferable independently of,' the thing
or physical object embodying the work. Such property has
been characterized as "ill-defined"' but various dicta
have essayed to define it broadly.27 Briefly and flexibly,
20 This property is said to have been first recognized in "Very early
times" and although still frequently spoken of as "literary property," due to
the accident and "momentum of history," it is no longer limited to literary
material. Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324 (2d
Cir. 1904).
21 Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1896), appeal dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, 164 U.S. 105 (1896); Werckmeister v. Springer
Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894); Parton v. Prang, 18 Fed.
Cas. 1273, No. 10,784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 7
Am. Rep. 480 (1872).
22 DeAcosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
862 (1945); Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930); DRoNz,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY iN I CTELcTuAL PRODUcTIONS 110 (1879); WEL, LAW
OF COPYRIGHT 116 (1917). Originality in this context, as under the Constitu-
tion and the Code, means merely that the work is the author's own, that it
"owes its origin" to him and is not "a mere copy of something else." Dxo-z,
op. cit. supra, at 110; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 102
(2d Cir. 1951); Wel, op. cit. supra, at 394.
23 Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., supra note 20, at 324;
Fendler v. Morosco, supra note 22, at 60.
24 Stephens v. Cady, 55 US. (14 How.) 528, 530 (1852).
25 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Werck-
meister v. Pierce & Bushnell Manuf'g. Co., 63 Fed. 445 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894),
rev'd on other grounds, 72 Fed. 54 (1st Cir. 1896).
26 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 84 (1899).
27 In Harper & Bros. v. M. A. Donohue & Co., 144 Fed. 491 (N.D. M. 1905),
aff'd per curiam, 146 Fed. 1023 (7th Cir. 1906) it is described as:
"The sole, exclusive interest, use, and control. The right to its
(Vol. xxJ
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this common law property is said to be essentially, when
conceived of negatively, ". . a right to exclude, to a
greater or lesser extent, others from making some or all
use of the expressed thoughts of an author."'2 In its af-
firmative aspects it includes among its attributes the ex-
clusive right to duplicate and reproduce the work, to
effect initial publication of it and to secure statutory copy-
right to it.29
It is important to bear in mind that the property or
right of which we are speaking is a pre-publication one,
that is, one which does not survive the authorized publica-
tion of the work.3 Once the work is so published,"' either
27 continued
name, to control, or prevent publication. The right of private exhibi-
tion, for criticism or otherwise, reading, representation, and re-
stricted circulation; to copy, and permit others to copy, and to give
away a copy; to translate or dramatize the work; to print without
publication; to make qualified distribution. The right to make the
first publication. The right to sell and assign her interest, either ab-
solutely or conditionally, with or without qualification, limitation, or
restriction, territorial or otherwise, by oral or written transfer." See
also, Parton v. Prang, 18 Fed. Cas. 1273, 1277, No. 10,784 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1872); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Inc, 208 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1949);
WEmL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 115.
28 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 662
(2d Cir. 1955).
29 Caliga v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182 (1909); American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Ricordi & Co. v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951); Werckneister v. Springer
Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894); Yuengling v. Schile,
12 Fed. 97 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1882).
30 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954); Caliga v. Inter-Ocean News-
paper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909). Distinction is made between a general
publication and a limited publication. The former will destroy the common
law property; the latter will not affect it. American Tobacco Co. v. Werck-
meister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Werckineister v. American Lithographic Co.,
134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).
31 That is, in such manner as under decisional law constitutes a "gen-
eral" publication, one limited neither as to persons nor purposes. White v.
Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952). While the Code mentions ' publication"
without qualification by providing that: "any person entitled thereto . . . may
secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice re-
quired by this title; and such notice shall be afixed to each copy thereof
published or offered for sale in the United States by authority of the copy-
right proprietor... 2' 17 US.C. § 10, the word 'general" has been read into
that provision. See also Henn, Magazine Rights-A Division of Indivisible
Copyright, 40 Cop.zLu L.-Q. 411, 414 n. 12 (1954). However, the dichotomy
1956)
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the panoply of statutory copyright protects it, if the re-
quirements of the statute as to notice are at least sub-
stantially fulfilled,3" or the work passes from the private
into the public domain, whence it can never be retrieved.3
Section 2 of the Code3 does not necessarily sanction or
implement, but rather leaves undisturbed,3 such "right"
as ". . . the author or proprietor of an unpublished
work... [has] ... at common law or in equity, to prevent
the... [unconsented to] ... copying, publication, or use of
such unpublished work.., and to obtain damages there-
for."36 But that section together with section 10 of the
31 continued
between general and limited publication can be misleading and its abandon-
ment has been urged. WEL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 125, since a "limited"
publication is really no publication, for copyright purposes, and a "general"
publication, for such purposes, may be spelled out by the authorized and
unrestricted sale of but a single copy of the work. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 147 Fed. 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1906), aff'd, 210 US. 339 (1908); Grandma
Moses Properties, Inc. v. This Week Magazine, 117 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Joe Mittenthal, Inc. v. Irving Berlin, Inc., 291 Fed. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1923);
Stern v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 175 Fed. 282 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); Baker v.
Taylor, 2 Fed. Cas. 478, No. 782 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1848); WMlL, op. cit. supra
note 22, at 124.
32 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191
F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,
161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947); Hollywood
Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Dushkin, 107 U.S.P.Q. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). If copyright
under the Code is secured, not a scintilla of the common law property
remains, since the two are mutually exclusive. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler,
194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); Photo-Drama Motion P. Co. v. Social Uplift Film
Corp., 220 Fed. 448 (2d Cir. 1915); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v.
Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898). But cf.,
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 216 Ft2d
945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955), as to non-includible
character rights.
33 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191
F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829
(2d Cir. 1922); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers" Weekly Pub.
Co., note 32 supra.
3 17 US.C. § 2 (1952).
35 Photo-Drama Motion P. Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed. 448,
450 (2d Cir. 1915).
36 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1952). Although the Congress, under the copyright
clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is, I submit, empowered
to act substantively with regard not only to published, but also to all kinds
of unpublished works (which are "writings"), it has not done so. This § 2
of the Code is the statutory "successor of R.S. § 4967, which was itself the
[Vol. XXXI
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Code37 show that, except for the historically anomalous
rightas accorded by section 12 thereof to certain specifically
enumerated unpublished works,39 the statute does not
reach unpublished works, and that as to such works the
authors or proprietors thereof must look to the common
law for protection. Under our "erieantompkinated '"4 juris-
prudence, that is tantamount to saying resort must be had
to local or state, as distinguished from federal, law.4'
30 continued
successor of § 9 of the Act of February 3, 1831, 4 STAT. 438, and it is settled
that that section only granted a remedy cumulative upon the state remedies
and is not the basis of the author's 'common-law property'." Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 666 (2d Cir. 1955)
(dissenting opinion by L. Hand, C. J.).
37 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952).
38 Shilkret v. Musicraft Records, 131 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 742 (1943).
39 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1952). This section, submittedly for no sound reason,
designates only certain kinds of works, as divergent as dramas and photo-
graphs or lectures and works of art, and permits claims to copyright for
them to be registered if such works have not been reproduced in copies for
sale. This section provides the only means within the statutory scheme by
which a work may be protected under the Act in advance of its otherwise
necessary initial publication. Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 93
F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937). However, as Professor Chafee has remarked, the
section contains specifically "labeled boxes," and, unless the work in
question can be pressed into one of them, it is ineligible for protection in
its unpublished state. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45
COLum. L. REV. 503, 521 (1945). Works such as novels, short stories, histories,
articles and poems are ineligible.
40 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts, in JUpmSRUDENCE 3N ACTION-
A PLEADER'S ANTHOLOGY 53, 61 (1953).
41 By force of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a neat
example not only of the application of the substantive state law of New
York to a question of common law property in distinctive performances of
musical compositions embodied in phonograph recordings, but also of how a
federal court will resolve the usually complicated issue of the conflict of
laws in this field "upon principle"--as a matter of general jurisprudence-
by applying the substantive law of the forum or place where protection is
sought, notwithstanding important contacts elsewhere, see Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). On the choice
of law phase, see also Ferris v. Frotman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912). The pre-
scription that federal courts should apply state law to matters involving
common law literary property does not necessarily make inapposite those
decisions rendered by federal courts during the pre-Erie Railroad dis-
pensation. On the contrary, those determinations will continue to operate
as cogently persuasive guides, and, absent contrary state holdings on the
subject, they will control. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86
19563
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Now let us assume that A, in the role of a novelist, short
story writer or painter,42 has created an original work
and that he has thereby acquired the property which the
common law says he may have in and to it.4' At this junc-
ture, A stands in a dual relation to the work: he is both
the author and the original proprietor of it. Up to this
point none but the doting eyes of A, and perhaps the more
objective and therefore less doting eyes of his wife and
choice friends, among whom he hds privately circulated
it, have seen it. Up to this point the work is unpublished.
Well, what may A, our hypothetical author, do next
vis-a-vis his work? Of course, he may stow it away or
do nothing more extensive with it than heretofore, thus
preserving, potentially in perpetuity, his literary prop-
erty. But if he does only such, we should have done with
him (and he with us). However, if he is more mundane-
minded and desires to put his "work" to work, so to
speak, a number of courses is open to him. Let us follow
some of those, noting as we proceed their legal twists,
41 continued
(2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). Of course, state courts
will do likewise. Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Inc. 287 N.Y. 302,
39 N.E.2d 249 (1942).
42 A might have produced any kind of "writing," whether literary,
artistic, photographic, dramatic or musical. We have cast A as a novelist,
short story writer or painter merely by way of illustration. Of course, it
should be borne in mind that a "writing" under the common law and also
possibly under the copyright claue of the Constitution, may be more in-
clusive than a "writing" under the Code. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955), and the dissent of L. Hand, C.J.
at 664; Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 CoLum. L. REv.
719, 735 (1945).
43 We are assuming that none of the works in question has been created
for hire or in execution of a commission for pay, in which case the com-
mon law property in the work would belong to the employer or to the
patron or party for whom it had been created. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939); Brown v. Molle Co., 20 F. Supp. 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1937); Dielman v. White, 102 Fed. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900). For the
same rule governing photographs as when one has his picture taken and
pays the photographer for the photograph and for his services in taking
it, see Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distributing Corp., 280 Fed. 550 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922); Altman v. New Haven Union Co.,
254 Fed. 113 (D.C. Conn. 1918).
[Vol. xx~xi
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turns and effects, for we are now virtually at the threshold
of statutory copyright.
For one thing, A may submit and offer to sell the manu-
script of his novel or short story4" or the original of his
painting to a potential purchaser. Such submission and
offer are not tantamount to a publication divestitive of the
common law literary property in the work.' Should the
offer to sell ripen into an unconditional sale, one without
express reservation of rights on A's part, the purchaser
will have acquired all of A's common law literary prop-
erty.4" Although A may have intended to reserve certain of
the rights, if the transfer contains no term or provision
expressive of such reservation, the law will generally im-
ply none, 7 and A's purchaser will, consequently, stand
full square in the author's place. The purchaser will have
become the proprietor of all of the common law rights
in the work, as well as the proprietor of the manuscript or
original painting itself.4"
Suppose the situation is modified so that, instead of
assigning by sale or otherwise the manuscript or original
work of art without retention of rights, our author splits
44 Or the work may be what in magazine publishing trade is called a
"one shot"--something usually shorter than a novel but longer than a
short story. MAquAsw, THmTy YEARs 144 (1954).
45 Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); Allen v.
Walt Disney Productions Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
46 Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939); Grandma
Moses Properties, Inc. v. This Week Magazine, 117 F. Supp. 348 (S.DN.Y.
1953); Parton v. Prang, 18 Fed. Cas. 1273, 1278, No. 10,784 (C.C.D. Mass.
1872); Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E2d
249 (1942). Contra, Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528, 530 (1852)
(dictum).
41 Dam v. Kirk LaShelle Co., 175 Fed. 902 (2d Cir. 1910); Nash v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the circumstances of the case may be such as to clearly indicate
that the author intended to withhold the common law property, in which
event the possession of the manuscript will not carry with it the incidents of
that property. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., supra note 46; Chamberlain
v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E2d 863 (1949).




this overall property in two by transferring title to the
tangible article or physical object to one and by assigning
the incorporeal common law literary property to another,
as was done in the Werckmeister cases.49 When an author
so acts, the one to whom all literary property has passed,
and not the mere owner of the original thing,5" will quali-
fy, qua proprietor or assignee, for statutory copyright
under section 9 of the Code.51
In the foregoing suppositional situations the author
parted with all, and we emphasize that term, of his literary
property,52 with the result that he is no longer a legally
49 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Werck-
meister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904); Werck-
meister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894).
50 Ibid.; Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. 97 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882). However,
as to disposition of rights, the "ownership of an unpublished composition
presumptively includes all the rights which the common law recognized
therein, among them being the privilege of publication and of securing a
statutory copyright." Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23
F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927); Houghton Muffin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc.,
104 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 597 (1939).
51 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1952); see cases cited in note 49 supra. Section 9 of
the Code provides, inter alia, that "the author or proprietor of any work
made the subject of copyright by this title, or his executors, administrators,
or assigns, shall have copyright for such work. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Proprietor in this context, is a word of art freighted with historical
meaning, indicating one who derives his rights from the author. The term
"proprietor" appeared in the first copyright Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15,
1 STAT. 124, and subsequently in each of the major copyrighting acts--
Act of April 29, 1802, c. 36, 2 STAT. 171; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 STAT.
436; Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 STAT. 198; Act of March 3, 1891, c.
565, 26 STAT. 1106; and of course, in the Act of March 4, 1909, c. 320,
35 STAT. 1075, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-30, 101-215 (1952). Beginning with the Act of
July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 STAT. 198, the term has appeared in a substantially
similar type of granting clause. Proprietors have ".... practically .. . the
same meaning as 'legal assigns'..."-proprietor and assignee becoming le-
gal equivalents-so that one to whom the author's common law property
(which includes the author's exclusive right to statutory copyright) has
been assigned is the proprietor of the work and entitled to secure copyright
to it. Miffin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 262 (1903); Public Ledger
v. New York Times, 275 Fed. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 279 Fed. 747
(2d Cir. 1922); Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. 97 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882). That the
term proprietor has the same significance under the Code as it had under
prior law is supported by H. R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. (1909),
where it is said that the first part of § 9 (then § 8) "makes no change in
existing law." See HowELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 253 (3d ed. 1952).
52 This property is probably more extensive than that inhering in
statutory copyright inasmuch as no use, not even so-called "fair use," may
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significant factor in the copyright picture, having been en-
tirely replaced by the proprietor of that property. 3 The
proprietor's derivative right to statutory copyright is
soundly based, since he is able to trace his rights thereto to
the author." Accordingly, any attempt thereafter by the
author to secure such copyright will prove ineffectual.
So far we have concerned ourselves with some of the
simpler and more clear-cut relationships in which the legal
positions of an author and his nondescript transferee are
relatively definite and certain. However, let us now as-
sume that, in lieu of selling or otherwise disposing of his
common law property in toto, our author grants only
limited and restricted rights in his copyrightable and
therefore unpublished material to a publisher of a periodi-
cal 6 or composite work57 who, pursuant to such rights,
52 continued
be made of that to which it attaches. Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950); w m, op. cit. supra note 22,
at 115. Such broad coverage may be rationalized on the ground that, absent
publication, there can be no implied consent of the author or his assignee
arising therefrom fairly to use the work. This property will pass by
testamentary disposition and descend by intestacy.
53 Werclkmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808, 811
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894).
54 Bosselman v. Richardson, 174 Fed. 622 (2d Cir. 1909); Kaplan v. Fox
Film Corp., 19 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
55 Ripley v. Findlay Galleries, Inc., 155 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 775 (1946).
56 A periodical may be a newspaper or a magazine or other media
published at regular intervals. The Code treats periodicals as comprising
a separate class of copyrightable works for registration purposes and re-
dundantly speaks of "periodicals, including newspapers." 17 U.S.C. § 5(b)
(1952). If a work is published more frequently than annually, it is con-
sidered a periodical under Regulation 202.3 of the Regulations of the Copy-
right Office wherein periodicals are defined as including ". . . newspapers,
magazines, reviews and serial publications which appear at intervals of less
than a year." If the work for which copyright is claimed under the Code
does not possess the requisite periodicity of publication, it may and should
be registered as a book. See also Henn, supra note 31, at 413 n. 11.
57 A "composite work" is one "made up of distinct parts or ele-
ments. . . " MErAx-WFssTzR NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 548. It
consists of distinguishable "matter drawn from various sources or con-
tributed by different authors." WEl., op. cit. supra note 22, at 178. The
distinctive characteristic of a composite, differentiating it from a "joint
work" or from a thematically or textually interdependent or unified work,
is that its parts are clearly discrete and readily capable of being used
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generally publishes it or a separately copyrightable re-
production or other version of it. As a point of departure
for such discussion, we shall examine two recent statutory
copyright infringement cases: Leigh v. Gerber,59 and
Leigh v. Barnhart.6" These cases, though each a decision
of a court of first instance, raise a goodly number of ques-
tions of varying nicety and import pertinent to our
inquiry. Although different in procedural posture,6 ' the
last adverted-to cases involve similar basic issues of
substantive law, and may, therefore, be considered to-
gether.
57 continued
or are "intended to be used separately and whose only unity is that they
are bound tdgether." Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944). See also, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955). The Code con-
tains significant references to composite works in 17 U.S.C. §§ 3, 5, 24
(1952). It has been held that the distinguishable components of composite
works under the Code, though separately copyrightable, need not be
separately authored. Markham v. A. E. Borden Co., 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir.
1953). While in terms of dictionary semantics, the Markham case appears
correct in not strictly requiring that the distinct components of a composite
work be contributed by different persons, nevertheless, the emphasis for
Code purposes has been upon such independently authored contributions
as constitutive of a composite. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d
697, 699 (2d Cir. 1941). See also the dictum in Harris v. Coca-Cola Co.,
73 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1934). And such is consonant with the intention
of the Congressional Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1909), where it is said relative to § 3 of the Code, that it ".... does
away with the necessity of taking a copyright on the contributions of
different persons . .. included in a single publication." HowELL, op. cit.
supra note 51, at 263. For certain purposes, composite works and periodicals
are considered alike, 17 U.S.C. §§ 3, 24 (1952), but are placed in different
classes, the former being classified as a book. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (a) (1952).
58 Reproductions of works of art are in a class by themselves, 17
U.S.C. § 5(h) (1952), and accordingly are, under the statutory pattern, in-
dependently copyrightable if original. Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); 37 C.F.R. § 202.9 (Supp. 1955). Similarly, other original
versions of copyrighted literary works are independently copyrightable as
are other original versions of matter in the public domain or of copyrighted
matter, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 (b), 7 (1952). The same work may be copyrightable as
a reproduction of a work of art and as another version thereof. Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
59 86 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
60 96 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.J. 1951).
61 The Gerber case, supra note 59, was a determination of plaintiff's




The material facts of the Leigh cases were as follows:
The plaintiff, an artist, had produced an original " paint-
ing, entitled Struggle for Existence, (a title which, inci-
dentally, from the way the cases went, proved more ironi-
cally appropriate than the plaintiff had any reason to
expect) and registered his claim to copyright in 1948
under then section 11, now section 12, of the Code.63
The original (as distinguished from a copy) of the painting
had been marked with plaintiff's copyright notice reading
"W. R. Leigh 1947 (c)"; subsequently, he authorized
Parade, a composite work in the form of a periodical dis-
tributed as a newspaper section or supplement, to publish,
but only once, a reproduction of the painting. Thereafter,
without any specific notice of copyright on the reproduc-
tion, Parade published the reproduction" in one of its
62 Originality, as indicated supra in note 22, is, under the Code, not to
be confounded with novelty or equated with artistic merit. Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955). Since
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), the courts
have studiously declined to make their own value judgments or to play the
part of critics so that even ". . . trivialities having pecuniary value," if
original, may enter the house of copyright. Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263
Fed. 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1920). While indispensably necessary by reason of
the authorship requirement of the Constitution and of the Code, "originality
. . . 'means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.' No matter
how poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his
own." Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103, (2d
Cir. 1951); Rushton v. Vitale, supra. Of course, what we have said relative
to originality for copyright purposes is not to be taken as any evaluation,
and certainly not as a pejorative one, of the qualities of the particular
painting now under discussion.
63 17 U.S.C. §§ 11, 12 (1952).
64 We have been advised that the instant reproduction was in the form
of a print on paper made from a photo-engraving of the painting. The
photo-engraving technique of today, despite its improved tools and the
employment of an acid resist in place of the hitherto dexterously operated
burin in etching, is still an art demanding a high degree of skilled crafts-
manship. That technique usually involves the following eight basic proc-
esses or steps: (1) photographing; (2) negative turning or stripping;
(3) printing; (4) etching on metal, with copper used rather than zinc for
greater color fidelity or tone gradations, and in this step an etching machine
is used; (5) routing; (6) blocking; (7) finishing (here hand etching and
burnishing take place); (8) proofing. SouBIRA, THE ART & TscHaIQuE OF
PHOTO-ENGRAVING 18 (1952). Engravings, etchings, and prints as finished
works (as distinguished from intermediate works) were first made copy-
rightable by the Act of April 29, 1802, c. 36, 2 STAT. 171. An engraving
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copyrighted issues, that is, in an issue which carried in due
form and position Parade's own general or blanket notice
of copyright. After such publication and without the con-
sent of either the plaintiff or Parade, the defendants
directly copied that reproduction and published their un-
authorized copy in other media, disclaiming both access to
and knowledge of the plaintiff's original painting and his
copyright to it. 66 In neither of the cases did the plaintiff
prevail, despite the patently deliberate, direct copying of
the published reproduction and, perforce, the indirect and
pro tanto copying of the original painting. Should he
have prevailed? We submit that he should, although such
conclusion is by no means clearly compelled.s
Upon analysis of the issues in the Leigh cases we find,
in the first place, that the plaintiff-artist had availed him-
self, in an apparently atypical fashion, of section 12 of the
64 continued
or a print taken from wood is usually called a woodcut. An engraving on
metal, or a print made therefrom, is usually called an etching. The designs
of such cuts or etchings may be original or derivative. A print may be any
pictorial work "printed from something other than the substance on which"
it "now appears." Hills & Co. v. Austrich, 120 Fed. 862, 863 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1903). Under the Code, engravings, etchings and woodcuts are not sep-
arately classified in 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1952). Accordingly, such works would
appear to fall within class (g) of the section if they are in themselves
original works of art; or, if they are derived from other works of art, then
within class (h) as reproductions of works of art, provided, in the latter
case, they "contain in themselves an artistic element distinct from that of
the original work of art which has been" thus "reproduced." Prints together
with pictorial illustrations come within class (k) of § 5 which covers "printed
pictures, such as lithographs, photo-engravings etc." 37 C.F.R. § 202.12 (Supp.
1955).
65 17 U.S.C. §§ 3, 10, 19, 20 (1952).
66 Neither the absence of direct contact with a protected work nor
the innocence of the copyist will exonerate unauthorized copying. De Acosta
v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945). See
also, Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) on the im-
materiality of an "intention to infringe."
67 The most fundamental of the plurality of exclusive rights inhering in
copyright under the Code, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (1952), is the copyrightee's right
to copy in whole or material part what is original in his work. Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
68 These cases have been animadverted upon as unsound. Henn,
Magazine Rights-A division of Indivisible Copyright, 40 ComLzL L. Q.
411, 459, 460 n. 197 (1954).
[Vol. XXXI
COPYRIGHTING OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Code, which was open to him because of the kind and
condition of his work-a work of art "... of which copies
are not reproduced for sale.... .6" When he deposited in
the Copyright Office "an identifying reproduction" of his
painting and registered his claim to copyright in pursuance
of that section, he secured a statutory copyright to his
work, thereby making the same bargain with the public
as he would have made had he published copies of the
painting with requisite notice under section 10 of the
Code.70 In other words, under such quid pro quo theory,
the plaintiff exchanged his common law property for the
statutory grant.71 "When the copyright.. ." came .. . in,
the common law right . . ." went ". . . out. .. ."' Even
though neither the deposit of the "identifying reproduc-
tion," nor the registration of the claim to copyright, spelled
out a publication of the work,73 once such copyright was so
secured its initial term began to run,74 and this despite
the Code's own timetable providing that "the copyright
... shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of
first publication... ." (Emphasis added.) Furthermore,
69 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1952). This section provides the one method by
which certain designated unpublished works may be copyrighted.
70 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952). This section contains the basic and usual
method by which copyright may be obtained to all works copyrightable
under the Code. It provides for the investitive publication of works by
stating that "any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copy-
right for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright
required by this title. . ."
73 G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d
Cir. 1951); Werckmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894). One of the essential purposes of statutory copyright
is to induce an author or proprietor to "bring out" his work, to make
it accessible to the public.
72 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
216 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955); See also,
Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed.
448 (2d Cir. 1915).
73 At least not the "publication" contemplated by 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 13
(1952). Such publication comes about later when the work is "reproduced
in copies for sale." Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 490
(2d Cir. 1937).
74 Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938).
75 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952). See note 74 supra.
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since a section 12 copyright is not initiated by publication,
the plaintiff was not required to affix any notice of copy-
right either to the original or to the deposited "identifying
reproduction"7'6; therefore, his so doing upon the original
was a supererogatory act, without legal consequence. Ad-
ditionally, the erroneously dated notice' which the plain-
tiff had affixed contained a too-early rather than a too-
late date so that, even if such notice had been necessary,
the error would have been legally innocuous effecting only
a shortening of the copyright term.7"
So far Mr. Leigh is on firm ground. However, when he
thereafter authorized Parade to make and publish a re-
production of his painting and Parade acted in pursuance
of the authorization but without specifically imprinting on
the reproduction notice of the plaintiff's copyright, a
cluster of questions, particularly perplexing to the probing
mind of the court in the Gerber case, emerged. On this
posture of the cases we should first consider the plain-
tiff's authorization to make and publish the reproduction.
Manifestly, such authorization amounted to no more than
a license because Parade was permitted to publish only
once. 9 Had the plaintiff granted all reproduction rights
76 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19 (1952). See also the dictun in Patterson v.
Century Productions, Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1937).
77 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1952). This section prescribes the form or content of
the notice and does not require any year date for a work of art or for any
of the works comprised within subsections (f) to (k) inclusive of 17
U.S.C. § 5 (1952). Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
78 American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829 (2d Cir. 1922); Leigh
v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Basevi v. Edward O'Toole Co.,
26 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Baker v. Taylor, 2 Fed. Cas. 478, No. 782
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1848). It should be noted, however, that this rule, pred-
icated upon a misdating in favor of the public, creates a lacuna during
which there is probably no protection despite the running of the copy-
right term against the copyrightee. This anomalous situation was con-
sidered, in passing, in Basevi v. Edward O'Toole Co., supra. Furthermore,
if a work is of a "printed literary, musical or dramatic" nature, that is,
one for which the Code requires the date of first publication in the
prescribed notice, 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1952), the erroneously early date should
be maintained in future notices because first publication has been thereby
irremediably determined.
79 Public Ledger Co. v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 294 Fed. 430
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to his painting, the grant would have been equivalent to
an assignment, Parade would have become a full-fledged
proprietor of the independently copyrightable reproduc-
tions ° which it-had made, and, upon its publication, Pa-
rade's general copyright in its own name would have
satisfied the notice requirements of the Code."" A grant of
such reproduction rights would have had the same effect
if the original painting had not been copyrighted.
While it is true that when one deals with statutory copy-
right he must contend with the consequences of notions
of copyright solidity or indivisibility, 2 especially as they
clog matters of copyright notice; nevertheless, since copy-
79 continued
(8th Cir. 1923); Leigh v. Barnhart, 96 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.J. 1951); Quinn-
Brown Pub. Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); M.
Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924);
Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 Fed. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aif'd, 279
Fed. 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 627 (1922); New Fiction Pub.
Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). The crucial distinction is
to be borne in mind between a license of limited rights, on the one hand
and an assignment of sufficient rights to include copyright proprietorship
on the other hand. See note 51 supra. Also HowmL, Tim COPYRIGHT LAw
157 (1952). Grants of considerably greater scope than Leigh's to Parade
have been construed as mere licenses, as the last cited authorities dem-
onstrate.
80 17 U.S.C. § 5(h) (1952). Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., 81 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). The instant reproduction, submittedly, was more than a mere
copy of the painting. Since 1865 photographs have constituted independently
copyrightable subject matter. Altman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 Fed.
113 (D. Conn. 1918). On that basis alone this reproduction would appear
sufficiently original in a copyright sense, vis-a-vis the painting, to have
been likewise copyrightable. Admittedly, there is the inherent ambiguity
in the word "reproduction." It may mean: (1) a mere duplicate or visible
copy, or (2) a derivative likeness expressed in a different form or embodied
in a different medium and possessing more than trivial original qualities
distinct from its source. When the latter, it is entitled to its own copy-
right status. Moreover, by parity of reasoning, Parade's reproduction
would have been so copyrightable whether considered a print or a
variant or other version of a copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(k), 7
(1952). National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,
191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
81 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952). Mail & Express Co. v. Life Pub. Co., 192 Fed.
899 (2d Cir. 1912).




right is comprised of separable exclusive rights out of
which new copyrightable works may be derived, 3 the
grant by the copyrightee of all of at least certain of those
rights will suffice to constitute the grantee the proprietor of
the new copyrightable work and the notice of copyright
thereon in the grantee's name will comply with the Code."
However, as we have seen, Mr. Leigh had made no such
grant to Parade, and the latter accordingly did not be-
come the copyright proprietor of the reproduction. As a
mere licensee, Parade might have carried a copyright
notice in Leigh's name on the reproduction, and to have
done so would have been the indubitably correct and
prudent course, whether the reproduction be viewed as
a work entitled to its own copyright or, a fortiori, as a
mere copy of the original painting.'
Inasmuch as such course was not followed, the court
in the Barnhart case held that Parade, qua licensee, could
not secure a valid copyright to the published reproduction;
consequently Parade's general copyright did not cover it,
and that particular reproduction passed into the public
domain.'5 Thus premised, the court found no infringe-
83 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(b), 7 (1952).
84 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191
F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951); Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social
Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed. 448 (2d Cir. 1915).
85 To have done so would have preserved the subsisting copyright to the
painting, on the theory that Parade's published reproduction was a mere
duplicate or copy of the painting. 17 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 19 (1952). Further-
more, on the ground that the reproduction of the painting, which could
have been validly made and published only with Leigh's consent, 17
U.S.C. § 7 (1952), qualified for a new copyright and since all of the rights
thereto, excepting only the right of initial publication, had been retained
by Leigh, such new copyright would belong to Leigh, and assuredly might
have been initiated by publication of the reproduction and of copies
thereof under specific notice in Leigh's name as proprietor. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 5, 9, 10, 19 (1952).
86 Leigh v. Barnhart, 96 F. Supp. 194, 195 (D.N.J. 1951). Without more,
a licensee is ineligible for copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1952); Mifflin v. R. H.
White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903). See also the cases cited in note 89 infra.
Despite its implication that the Parade reproduction was more than a
mere copy of the painting, the rationale in the Barnhart case supra, failed
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ment. 7 Parenthetically, the court left open whether the
loss of copyright to the Parade reproduction entailed the
forfeiture of plaintiff's copyright to his original painting."8
Even though it is settled law that a mere licensee may
not take out copyright under the Code, 9 an author
may effectively authorize his licensee to secure copy-
right in the latter's name." When copyright is so secured
it will be held by the licensee not only to protect his
rights thereunder, but also for the benefit, on a trust
basis, of the author to protect the latter's ungranted or
86 continued
to consider the possible application of § 7 of the Code. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1952).
Moreover such rationale should not have completely disregarded § 3 of
the Code, 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952), as will more fully appear hereafter. Compare
the Barnhart case with approach of Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y.
1949), relative to § 3 of the Code.
87 The logic of the court's determination that copyright to the re-
production was forfeited required such finding even though the reproduc-
tion inescapably embodied some of the painting and the court failed to
invalidate the copyright to the painting. By way of dictum, the court in-
dicated that even if the published reproduction had been validly copy-
righted by Parade, there had been no assignment of the reproduction copy-
right by it to Leigh. There would have been force to that dictum had the
ownership of the reproduction copyright been equitably as well as legally
in Parade. Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 Fed. 136 (C.C.N.D. 1ll. 1907); Champney
v. Haag, 121 Fed. 944 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903). In our opinion, however, there
was no such coalescing of title. See the analysis in note 85 supra and
the authorities cited in notes 89 and 90 infra.
88 If and to the extent that the reproduction was a "copy" of the paint-
ing, the failure to imprint upon authorizedly published copies of the former
the copyright notice of the latter, there would be a forfeiture of the
copyright to the painting. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952); National Comics Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
89 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1952). Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903);
Eaner v. E. C. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 730 (1944); Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 Fed. 562
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 279 Fed. 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 627
(1922); Saake v. Lederer, 174 Fed. 135 (3d Cir. 1909); Fraser v. Yack, 116
Fed. 285 (7th Cir. 1902); Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Leigh v. Barnhart, 96 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.J. 1951).
90 Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924); Public Ledger Co. v. Post
Printing & Publishing Co., 294 Fed. 430 (8th Cir. 1923); T. B. Harms & Francis,
Day & Hunter v. Stern, 229 Fed. 42 (2d Cir. 1916); Quinn-Brown Pub.
Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); WElL, LAW Or
CopYRiGHT 320 (1917). Also, there is the significant intimation in Mifflin
v. R. H. White Co., supra note 89, at 262, that authority for this purpose,
had it been supported by the evidence, would have sustained the copy-
right there in issue.
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reserved rights." Authority for this purpose, that is, to
empower and entitle one having but a restricted right of
user in a copyrightable work to become the proprietor of
the copyright to be obtained, should be firmly grounded
in evidentiary fact, else it will not be legally sanctioned. 2
It will not be inferred from the mere license to use. 3 Such
actual authority however, from an author,94 may be ex-
pressly95 or impliedly 6 given. That being so, when found
to exist in custom or established trade practice, the
requisite authority should be equally efficacious,' absent
of course, a provision in the license or conduct to the con-
trary. And custom or trade practice of that nature has
been judicially recognized.9
91 Press Pub. Co. v. Falk, 59 Fed. 324 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894). In Quinn-
Brown Pub. Corp. v. Chilton, supra note 90, at 214, it is said: ". . . there
is nothing extraordinary in the owner of a production authorizing another
to obtain copyright on it, to be held for joint benefit." See also, Bisel v.
Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924); Brady v. Reliance Motion Picture Corp.,
229 Fed. 137 (2d Cir. 1916); Alexander v. Irving Trust Co., 132 F. Supp. 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), April
Productions, Inc. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 366, 126 N.E.2d 283, 289
(1955).
92 See note 91 supra.
93 Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903); Leigh v. Barnhart, 96
F. Supp. 194 (DrN.J. 1951); Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
94 That is, any person or party owning the common law property
in the work.
95 See note 91 supra. Also see, Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Henn, supra note 68, at 433, where the author of this
scholarly and encyclopedic article suggests a reconciliation of the cases
on the basis of what he calls the "'manifested-intention-to-transfer-the pro-
prietorship' test."
96 April Productions, Inc. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 366, 126
N.E.2d 283, 289 (1955); WEH,, op. cit. supra note 90, at 320.
97 April Productions, Inc. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., supra note 96. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 102 F. Supp.
141, 145 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
98 Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. American Communications Ass'n., C.I.O., 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d
162 (1949).
99 Kaplan v. Fox Film Corp., 19 F. Supp. 780, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
April Productions, Inc. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 366, 126 N.E.2d




It is submitted that, particularly in the field of periodical
publishing, it is the custom or established trade practice
for authors who contribute their literary or artistic ma-
terial to those media to authorize the publishers thereof
to copyright the contributions in the names of the pub-
lishers, usually under blanket or general notices of copy-
right imprinted on the periodicals,"0 and to hold such
copyrights for the authors to the extent that they have
retained rights in the contributions."0
The facet of the rule of authority to which we have
adverted seems to square with the realities of trade, at
least insofar as certain forms of publishing are concerned,
and, when given legal effect, the rule will operate to sustain
copyrights which might otherwise be lost depending upon
the intricacies and dialectical refinements by which licenses
and assignments of rights are differentiated. But a note of
caution must be interposed: this rule of authority applies
only to works still in their common law state, only to
matter upon which statutory copyright is to be secured in
the first instance. Hence, it should be borne in mind that
once copyright attaches, all copies0 2 of the work there-
after published in this country by the copyrightee or his
100 In 17 U.S.C. § 20 (1952), it is provided, inter alia, that "one notice
of copyright in each volume or in each number of a newspaper or
periodical published shall suffice."
101 The writer's submission is predicated upon more than a score of
years of legal representation of periodicals. Moreover, recently the writer
posed certain questions to what is believed to have been a representative
groul, of magazine and cartoon syndicate editors-nine in number. The
substance of the questions asked was: (a) the extent to which authors
request publishers to publish contributions under specific copyright notices
in the authors' names, and (b) whether it is the established practice in
the periodical publishing trade to cover by the periodicals' general copy-
right the contributions of individual authors rather than to cover them
by the authors' own copyrights secured by means of specific notices.
The consensus of the responding editors indicated: (a) that authors very in-
frequently ask for such specific notices and that is why they rarely
appear, and (b) that the well-known trade practice, acquiesced in and
approved by authors, is to cover and protect the contributions to a
periodical by means of general copyright in the publisher's name secured
on the whole of the periodical.
302 Other than those under 17 U.S.C. §§ 3, 7, or 21 (1952).
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licensee (or even by the assignee of the copyright).. 3 must
carry the notice of copyright in the copyrightee's name-
since there can be only one copyright on the same work"°
-on pain of forfeiture of the copyright.0 5
As we resume our consideration of certain aspects of
the Leigh cases, we find, and this is passing strange, that
no evidence appears to have been adduced by the plaintiff
in support of what we take to be the settled trade practice
by which Parade would have been authorized to copyright
the reproduction as a new work." 6 Absent this evidence, it
is understandably correct that the courts paid no heed to
the practice.0 7 Consequently, on that ground no new copy-
right to the reproduction could be validated. We might
observe in passing that, had a good copyright been ob-
tained by Parade to the reproduction and had the rights
thereunder belonged to Parade,"8 such copyright, rather
than Leigh's copyright to the painting, would probably
have been held to be the only one invaded by the defen-
dant's copying, and Parade the only party entitled to sue
103 It is only after an assignment of copyright has been recorded that an
assignee may substitute his name in the notice. 17 U.S.C. § 32 (1952). A
substitution prior to recording renders the notice fatally defective. Group
Publishers, Inc. v. Winchell, 86 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
104 Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d
809 (7th Cir. 1942); Markham v. A. E. Borden Co., 108 F. Supp. 695 (D.
Mass. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953). As a
corollary, if the same copyrightable work is simultaneously first published
in two or more separate media, such as newspapers or magazines, it may
not be validly covered by the different copyrights to those media; the
only safe and sound way to protect such work, whether an advertisement,
a syndicated cartoon or comic strip or other matter, is by one copyright to
it secured by specific notice of such copyright in the name of the pro-
prietor thereof.
105 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903); Wrench
v. Universal Pictures Co., 104 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
106 Only on such practice might Leigh have rested because apparently
he had not otherwise authorized Parade to copyright the reproduction in
its name for his benefit.
107 Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903).
10S 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). Also, an exclusive licensee under copyright may vindicate
his rights by suit for infringement by joining the copyright proprietor, and




Now let us turn to sections 3 and 7 of the Code.1 . to see
how they bear upon contributions to composites generally,
and incidentally upon the remaining issues of the Leigh
cases. We shall first consider all of section 3, noting that it
deals in part expressly with composite works.
As judicially analyzed and applied, section 3 of the Code
serves a retentive or preservative purpose rather than a
creative one. Unless that fact is kept clearly in mind, the
section can become a snare and a delusion. In its forepart,
the section pertains to those components of a copyrighted
work which constitute its copyrightable parts, and provides
that the copyright to the whole shall protect all such
parts. In a formal sense that is but another way of
saying that the greater includes the less. However, criti-
cal substantive problems remain: has a valid copyright
been secured on the work, and if so, which of the com-
ponent parts are copyrightable under it? The section
109 McDaniel v. Friedman, 98 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1938); Champney v.
Haag, 121 Fed. 944 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903). DRONE, Tm LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELCTUAL PRODUCTIONS 483 (1879). But the same act, we submit, might
have actionably infringed both copyrights if what had been distinctively
covered by each ("original" material) had thereby been tortiously copied;
to the extent that the reproduction "reproduced," i.e., copied, the paint-
ing, the copyright to the painting would have been infringed.
no 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952), provides:
"The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the copy-
rightable component parts of the work copyrighted, and all matter
therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without
extending the duration or scope of such copyright. The copyright
upon composite works or periodicals shall give to the proprietor
thereof all the rights in respect thereto which he would have if
each part were individually copyrighted under this title."
17 U.S.C. § 7 (1952), provides:
"Compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, drama-
tizations, translations, or other versions of works in the public
domain or of copyrighted works when produced with the consent
of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, or works re-
published with new matter, shall be regarded as new works subject
to copyright under the provisions of this title; but the publication
of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity of any
subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof,
or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the




supplies no answer to these problems.' But if it be as-
sumed that a good copyright to the whole has been ob-
tained, then that one general copyright will be spread so
as to copyright all those parts capable of being copyrighted
and of which the work is composed." Manifestly, that
does not mean that every part is so covered because a work
may contain parts which by their inherent nature are
unentitled to copyright status,"' or parts which are in the
public domain" or which rest under copyright belonging
to some one other than the proprietor of the copyright
to the whole."'
In so spreading the copyright, the forepart of the
section speaks of "component" rather than "constituent"
parts, and while there is perhaps a nuance of difference
between the precise dictionary meanings of those terms," 6
it is believed that the phrase "component parts" in this
context was intended to signify constituent or integral
parts of the whole; otherwise, we think, the afterpart of
the section becomes somewhat superfluous." 7 Admittedly,
however, the cases have not clearly distinguished the two
"' Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 Fed. 373 (2d Cir. 1920).
112 In this manner the section seems merely to be declaratory of prior
law, especially if the parts are interrelated. DRoNE, op. cit. supra note 109, at
144. See also, Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926); King Features
Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
113 Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938).
A mere copy lacking as it does any originality is so unentitled: Markham v.
A. E. Borden Co., 108 F. Supp. 695, 701 (D. Mass. 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953). See also, How=LL, THE CoPmHiusT LAw
43 (3d ed. 1952).
L14 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1952). See also, H.R. REP. No. 2222, 6th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1909); HowxLL, op. cit. supra note 113, at 202.
"5 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952). But this section specifically provides that "... all
matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting.. ." shall be pro-
tected, that is, preserved, note 110 supra.
116 "CoMPONENT, CONsTrTuENT, INGREDMENT, ELEET ... CoNsTrU ...
so far as it differs from ComroNExT (with which it is often exactly
synonymous), connotes . . . the essential or formative character of the
parts... ." AMsRi-WEssTER INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 547 (2d ed. 1934).
117 A construction of the Code which renders parts thereof mere
superfluities is not favored. Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d
572, 573 (9th Cir. 1941).
[Vol. XX.XI
COPYRIGHTING OF CONTRIBUTIONS
parts of the section in this respect, and have read the phrase
"component parts" into the composite works provisions
of the section, in which latter provisions little or no inter-
dependence or interrelation of parts is generally found or
required."'
Also, within the forepart of section 3 is the clause,
highly significant to our discussion, that the one copy-
right duly secured on the whole of the work will preserve
under its subsisting copyright whatever matter of that
nature is contained within the work."9 By virtue of that
saving clause, the notice of subsisting copyright need not
be affixed to the included matter, as it would but for the
clause." °
The instant saving clause of section 3, we submit, should
have been applied in the Barnhart case1 2 to the Parade
reproduction in order to preserve and vindicate the pre-
existing copyright to the painting, although to have done
so would have required Leigh to forego any new copy-
right to the reproduction. He had the right to so waive,
thus escaping a dilemma. On the basis that Parade's
licensed reproduction was a copy of the painting, as, of
course, it was in certain significant respects, Parade's gen-
eral copyright (concededly valid for a composite work)
would have protected the copyrighted painting,' and the
defendants' unlawful copying of that copy would have
been tantamount to the tortious copying of the paintingla
Us Markham v. A. E. Borden Co., 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953); King
Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); Harry Alter
Co. v. A. E. Borden Co., 121 F. Supp. 1941 (D. Mass. 1954).
319 See note 110 supra.
320 If there is no interdependence of parts then each part should carry
its own notice. Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 93 F_2d 489 (2d Cir.
1937). Furthermore, if the work as a whole is not published with due
notice of copyright, the included matter will not be protected. Sieff v.
Continental Auto Supply, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1941).
321 96 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.J. 1951).
12 See note 110 supra. Henn, Magazine Rights-A Division of Indivisible
Copyright, 40 CoRNmL L. Q. 460 n. 179 (1954).
123 De Acosta v. Brown. 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944).
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We shall now examine the afterpart of section 3V24 This
part provides essentially a rule of convenience and econo-
my whereby multiple specific copyright notices may, under
certain circumstances, be dispensed with as to the copy-
rightable and distinguishable parts or elements making
up a composite work or periodical. We have indicated that
such parts or elements may be entirely unrelated one to
another and such discreteness is usually the distinctive
feature of a composite. 2 As the result of such separate-
ness, specific notices would ordinarily be required.'26
However, by operation of the instant provisions, such
specific notices may be omitted. But, and this is of overrid-
ing importance, the general copyright of the composite
or periodical proprietor will only protect that which he
can properly copyright. Clearly, a proprietor can thereby
copyright his original selection, ordering or arrangement
of the composite or periodical as a whole.' He may also
thereby effectively copyright those parts of which he is
the author or the copyright proprietor. 9 However, section
3 does not change the rule that a general copyright on a
composite work or periodical, secured by the work's pro-
prietor, will not validly protect those parts with regard
to which the proprietor is a mere licensee,' absent the
requisite authority heretofore discussed.'3 ' Hence, the
124 See note 110 supra.
125 See note 57 supra.
126 Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937).
Contra, Ford v. Charles E. Blaney Amusement Co., 148 Fed. 642 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1906). That the afterpart of § 3 was designed to obviate this necessity
as to independent contributions is shown by the commentary in H.R. REP. No.
2222, cited and quoted in note 57 supra.
127 WEm, LAW OF COPYRIGHT 179 (1917).
128 Ibid. Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35
(7th Cir. 1926).
329 Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 Fed. 902 (2d Cir. 1910); Ford v. Charles
E. Blaney Amusement Co., 148 Fed. 642 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906).
-30 Mail & Express Co. v. Life Pub. Co., 192 Fed. 899 (2d Cir. 1912);
Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Kaplan v. Fox Film Corp.,
19 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See also other cases cited in note 89 supra.
131 See notes 90-101 supra.
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mere. inclusion of copyrightable matter in a copyrighted
composite or periodical does not necessarily mean that
such matter rests safely under copyright.
Grant that a general copyright in the publisher's name
has been secured upon a composite work or periodical and
that such copyright will suffice to protect the parts of the
work including those independently contributed. In such
case, the composite works portion of section 3, as well as
the component parts portion thereof, provides for the ex-
pansion of the one general copyright to each part;" 2 it
does not, however, pluralize copyrights into as many
separate ones as there are distinguishable parts. 33 The
Markham case'3 in effect works such pluralization," 5
and in that regard we question its soundness.
Inasmuch as section 7 of the Code is, in certain par-
ticulars, germane to our central subject we shall limit
our consideration of it to those respects. Preliminarily, it
is to be noted that that section in part "reenacts existing
law,"' 3 but to an extent was intended to mark a departure
therefrom by permitting "the copyrighting of abridge-
1.32 See note 110 supra. Copyrightable matter on a front cover of a
periodical is a part of the periodical, and the general copyright should ex-
tend to such matter. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of
Fashion Modelling, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Kaplan v. Fox
Film Corp., note 130 supra. Contra, Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Elliot Pub.
Co., 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
133 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952), quoted in full in note 110 supra. Alter Co. v. A. E.
Borden Co, 121 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1954). But the copyright to each
separate work, such as a story or article, included within a periodical or
composite and published under a general notice may be separately assigned.
Kaplan v. Fox Film Corp., 19 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). And this could
have been done under prior law. Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 Fed. 902
(2d Cir. 1910).
134 Markham v. A. E. Borden Co., 206 F2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953).
'35 By treating each separate unit or item of a composite, rather than the
one copyrighted whole, as the framework within which to measure
materiality for infringement purposes. In that respect, the logic of the
Markcham rule seems to accord greater protection, improperly we believe,
to a composite work, such as a trade catalogue, than to a novel or other
thematically interdependent work.
136 H. R. RP. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. (1909) on § 7 (then § 6) of
the Code. HowELL, op. cit. supra note 113 at 202.
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ments and new versions of works, or works republished
with new matter,"' 37 without, however, enlarging or other-
wise affecting ". . . the force or validity of any subsisting
copyright upon matter employed.. ." in the new works
contemplated by the section."
In operation the last mentioned section proliferates
copyrights in that it treats the derivative works and the
so-called new matter republications specified therein as
subject to new copyright status. However, to justify the
new copyrights, the consent of the subsisting copyrightee
must be obtained,'39 and the new works must possess a
requisite minimum degree of originality. 4 ° As a corollary,
'37 H.R. REP. No. 2222, supra note 136. That so-called "fair abridgements"
had been earlier held not to constitute infringements of the copyrights to the
abridged works, see Henn, supra note 122, at 425 n. 67. Furthermore, under
prior law a substantially altered or revised edition or version of a pre-
viously copyrighted work was entitled to a new copyright, and upon publica-
tion of such edition or version the only notice of copyright entry called for
was that of the new copyright. West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co.,
176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1910).
338 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1952). See note 110 supra.
139 Unless the source matter or the republished matter is in the public
domain. Apart from the consent of the copyright proprietor needed to avoid
infringement, it is submitted that such consent is required under the
section when copyrighted matter is republished with new matter, although
the section's literal wording does not so require.
140 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1952). National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951);
Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927);
McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., 299 Fed. 48 (5th Cir. 1924); Jeweler's Circular
Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S.
581 (1922); West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir.
1910). See also notes 22 and 62 supra; HowELL, op. cit. supra note 113, at 67;
WEl., LAw op COPYRIGHT 178 (1917). The definite trend has been toward
a less exacting kind and degree of originality necessary to support copy-
right. Whereas under prior law "mere improvements," such as alto parts
added to songs the copyrights to which had expired, were held insufficiently
original, Cooper v. James, 213 Fed. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914), under the Code,
additions or variations which are merely "distinguishable," or not ". . . too
trivial to be noticeable by an ordinarily attentive reader or observer . .."
will satisfy the need for originality. National Comics Publications, Inc. v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc, supra at 600. In determining whether a work
qualifies for copyright under the instant section, it will not be disqualified
merely because it is so similar to its copyrighted source as to be an




the scope of the new copyrights thus engendered is to be
limited to that which is original in the new works. 41
Of the works which lie within the ambit of section 7,
we need to be concerned only with compilations,'42 new
versions 43 and new matter republications.' When a pro-
prietor of a copyrighted work contributes all or a part of
it to a copyrightable composite, in the nature of a compila-
tion or a new matter republication, or for the making of
another copyrightable version of it, of what should he be
especially wary? Quite obviously, prudence will dictate
that he be assured that his copyright be maintained. To
achieve that end, the proprietor may require that his con-
tribution, if identifiable as published in the compilation,
new matter republication or other version form, have
affixed to it notice of his pre-existing copyright.'45 But
the carrying of this specific notice may be impracticable,
and, under this section, to do so is not necessary. As ju-
dicially construed, the section in question will operate to
141 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., supra
note 140; G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note 140.
Consequently, the 'duration of the new copyright neither affects nor is
affected by the term of copyright to the basic work. G. Ricordi & Co, v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra.
142 These will generally be composite works, and if not "mere aggregates"
of other matter but evince some "originality" in the selecting or com-
bining of compiled material, they will be copyrightable. Hartfield v. Peter-
son, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937); Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v.
Boorman, 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1926). Moreover, since the copyrightee of a
work has the exclusive right to make compilations of it, if another so
compiles without his consent, despite the absence of copying, an infringe-
ment will be spelled out. National Geographic Soc. v. Classified Geographic,
Inc., 27 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1939).
143 It is not clear, at least in an affirmative sense, just what is meant
by "another version" under the Code. Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941). Brief outlines or summaries of copyrighted
operatic librettos have been held not to be infringing versions, G. Ricordi
& Co. v. Mason, 210 Fed. 277 (2d Cir. 1913); but "mezzotints"--a form of
metal engraving-of public domain matter have been considered to be
"other versions" of such matter and entitled to copyright under § 7. Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Aits, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
'44 Markham v. A. E. Borden Co., 108 F. Supp. 695 (D. Mass. 1952), rev'd
on other grounds, 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953); Wrench v. Universal Pictures
Co., 104 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
'45 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952). Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903).
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protect the subsisting copyright under a valid general copy-
right to the new work, and such protection will be accom-
plished by means of the one blanket notice of copyright
duly appearing on the copies of the new work. 46 If the last
mentioned course is to be followed, then, in order to
negative what would otherwise be the adverse con-
sequences of the failure to secure a good general copy-
right on the new work,'47 the proprietor of the copyright
to the contribution should condition his license to use it
by the requirement that the compiler, other versioner or
new matter republisher attach to the contribution the copy-
right notice prescribed by law. 4
Might Mr. Leigh have availed himself of the protective
efficacy of section 7? We think not, albeit the issue of
Parade was duly copyrighted and the reproduction con-
tained therein regarded as a new version. What we have
hitherto said militating against a valid reproduction-
copyright applies to a new version one under section 7.
Furthermore, since Leigh's painting had not been "pub-
146 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191
F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places To
Pat, Inc., 131 F2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942); West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson
Co., 176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1910); Wrench v. Universal Pictures Co., 104 F.
Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). N.B., unless the new work is properly copyrighted,
as by publication with due notice of its own copyright, the subsisting copy-
right on the employed or included matter will not be sustained, notwith-
standing the provision in the section that "... . the publication of any such
new works shall not affect the force or validity of . . ." that copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 7 (1952); Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, Inc., 39 F. Supp.
683 (D. Minn. 1941). Dictum to the contrary in Siewek Tool Co. v. Morton,
128 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1954), submittedly, is wrong as at variance
with the Code's underlying principle that the public be given a notice of
copyright. 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 21 (1952).
147 See note 146 supra. But see, DaoNE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY iN IN-
TELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 271 (1879).
148 This does not mean that a specific notice must be attached, in the
sense of juxtaposed, to the published copy of the contribution, if a general
notice in the name of the proprietor of the new-work-copyright is properly
applied to that work. But the conditioning will prevent the copyright to the
contribution from being forfeited, absent such general and specific notices.
National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d
594 (2d Cir. 1951); American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Pub. Co., 120 Fed.
766 (7th Cir. 1902).
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lished," Parade's copy of it did not constitute, we sub-
mit, republished matter; accordingly, the issue of Parade
did not qualify in that regard as a new matter republica-
tion. 49
Before closing the instant discussion, we wish to make
a few observations on the subject of the renewal of
copyrights in contributions to composite works and
periodicals.' Renewal of a copyright is provided for
in section 24 of the Code where those who may renew,
and the order in which they may renew, are specifically
designated. 1 Under that section, one who is the pro-
prietor of the copyright to a periodical or other composite
work originally secured by the proprietor of the work,
may renew such copyright. The section further states,
by way of proviso, ..... that in the case of any other copy-
righted work, including a contribution by an individual
author to a periodical or ... other composite work, the
author of such work... shall be entitled to a renewal and
extension of the copyright in such work for a further
term of twenty-eight years.... "152 Prior to the amendment
of 1 9 4 0 ' the quoted proviso had included the phrase
when such contribution has been separately reg-
149 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1952). We are not unmindful of the fact that courts
have variously construed, on a pro lI=e vice basis, the term "published" as
it appears in the Code; nevertheless, there is, and we believe there was
deliberately intended to be, a distinction between the publication and
republication of a work under the Code. 17 U.S.C. §§ 7,8 (1952). Edward B.
Marks Music Corp. v. Continental Record Co., 222 F2d 488, 491 (2d Cir.
1955). But see, Henn, supra note 122, at 460.
150 The general subject of renewal copyrights, has been ably treated
in Bricker, Renewdl and Extension of Copyright, 29 So. CAw. L. REy. 23
(1955), and also in Note, 44 COLux. L. Rav. 712 (1944).
3M1 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952). Renewal copyright is not a mere incident of
original copyright but supplementary thereto. Harris v. Coca-Cola Co.,
73 Fl2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709 (1935). And ". . a
copyright renewal creates a new estate ... [which] is clear of all rights,
interests or licenses granted under the original copyright" G. Ricordi &
Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 -F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
_M2 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952).
153 Act of March 15, 1940, c. 57, 54 STAT. 51.
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istered..." immediately following the words "composite
work."
In view of the above referred-to renewal provisions,
will a renewal of the copyright to a periodical or other
composite work by the proprietor of the original copy-
right effect a renewal of the original copyrights to the
independently authored contributions to the periodical
or composite work? We submit that it will not, unless the
proprietor of the original copyright to the periodical or
composite is otherwise and specifically entitled to the re-
newal copyrights in those contributions."
In conclusion, despite the persistence of certain difficul-
ties, is it noteworthy that the clearly perceptible trend has
been toward the enlargement of copyrightable subject
matter and the avoidance of overstrictness in construing
the Code.1' And that is as it should be. While some will
always create because, like Beaudelaire, they "burn to
paint," men in general need and should have the economic
encouragement that copyright affords - encouragement
which serves both public and private interest. At least such
is the faith of our Constitution and the Code.'56
Alfred H. Wasserstrom*
150 It is doubted that the proprietor of the original copyright to the com-
posite or periodical, qua such proprietor, could have done so prior to the
said amendment. Contra, Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370, 371 (5th
Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709 (1935). However that may be, the
amendment laid such doubt to rest, so that now such proprietor may not
properly renew for that purpose. Moreover there is the rule that rights
to renewal copyright, as distinct from those to original copyright, will not be
included within a grant of the latter unless therein specifically provided for.
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Edward
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Borst Music Pub. Co., 110 F. Supp. 913 (D.N.T.
1953). That rule tends to support, we submit, the position that the renewal
'of the copyright to a periodical or composite by the proprietor thereof,
nearly as such proprietor, did not before the 1940 amendment, nor will it
thereafter, secure any renewal copyrights to the independent contributions.
155 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955);
National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d
594 (2d Cir. 1951); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161
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F2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947); Trifari, Krussman
& Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551 (SD.N.Y. 1955).
156 Mazer v. Stein, supra note 155, at 219 where it is said:
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."
*Member of the firm of McCauley & Henry, New York City, N.Y. General
Counsel to the Hearst newspapers and magazines. Author of articles in the
field of Copyright Law. Member of the Board of Trustees and Executive
Committee of the Copyright Society of the United States. B.S. 1930 Uni-
versity of Virginia; LL.B. 1933 Columbia University; LL.M. 1956 New York
University.
